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Historical Aspects of Legal Interpretation
PETER GOODRICH*
A body of doctrine is an organized set of "truths" that are accepted as
authoritative. Their authority is incorporated in the transmission of the
doctrine. To be more accurate, it is inherent in the relationship linking
(religare) a plurality of receivers with a single sender who stands above
them.... Both materially and etymologically, the'authority of the word
is an effect of teaching.'
INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting developments within contemporary legal theory
has been the increasing importance accorded to the concept of interpretation.
It is fortunately no longer possible to speak uncritically of, or simply to
assume, the communicational and linguistic dimensions of legal regulation
or of legal institutional discourse. While the concepts of communication-
of discourse, language, text and sign-have long been key terms of debate
within philosophy, literary theory and cultural studies, it is really only very
recently that lawyers and particularly the legal academy have begun to take
a serious if somewhat defensive interest in these disputes. The issues raised
and the interests threatened are ponderous and vast; many of the dogmatic
articles of legal faith are at stake and it should not be viewed as surprising
if the debates as to the substantive implications of different forms of inter-
pretation appear at times extreme and the positions adopted seem labored
or untenable. The issues raised are intrinsically political: a direct challenge
is presented to the traditionally established motive and characteristics of legal
method, the humanistic tenets of legal philology are denied, and the liberal
ideology of the rule of law itself is again placed in question. In such a
context the current jurisprudential debates have an uncharacteristic urgency,
for it is not simply the legal educational apparatus that is asked to change
its course but, more dramatically, it is substantive legal practice and the
corresponding professional status or standing of the law that are placed in
balance.
Clearly the issues adverted to are too broad to form anything more than
a general though dynamic context to the present inquiry into the historical
status of the legal text as object of interpretation. As a further complication,
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it should be added that the issues to be sketched out cross not only the
traditional disciplinary boundaries of philosophy, linguistics, criticism and
law, but also transgress the geographical boundaries of theoretical traditions.
On one side, French structuralism and its inheritors within an increasingly
important Critique du Droit movement 2 is thrown together with German
hermeneutics3 and with Anglo-American traditions of critical linguistics 4 to
develop an as yet somewhat incoherent or superficial critical legal studies.
On the other side of the debate, institutional jurisprudence has responded
with an amalgam of European positivist philosophy of science, Anglo-Amer-
ican speech-act theory, analytical theories of verstehen or purposiveness in
rule following, and on occasion more weighty theories of an essentially
Germanic deontic logic or semiotics.5 While there is no common element
running through the debate, and even where key concepts or terms are used
across the divide, as is the case with the term "hermeneutics," which is used
both in positivist philosophy of law and in certain versions of deconstruction, 6
2. The principal theme within the French Critique du Droit school has been the episte-
mological claim that law is to be understood as a construct. For the structuralists, the con-
struction of law has to be understood in terms of the opposition of binary categories-the
opposition, for example, of the commodity form to the legal form which in turn opposes the
category of exchange to that of legal subjectivity, and that of expropriation to that of legal
right. The more recent work of the school has endeavored to develop a broader, nonessentialist
Marxian conception of critique and to analyze its applicability to law in terms of the discourse
of the legal institution and the reappropriation of legal ideology. See B. EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP
OF THE IMAGE (1979); M. MIALLE, UNE INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE AU DROIT (1976); Journ~s,
The Crisis of Marxism and Critical Legal Studies: A View from France, 10 INT'L J. Soc. LAW
2 (1982); Stewart, Pour une Science Critique du Droit, 25 ANNALES DE VAUCRESSON 201 (1985).
For an account of the more general epistemological debate, see E. LACLAU & C. MOUFFE,
HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY (1985).
3. Particularly the philosophy of language and of interpretation which develops from
German phenomenology combined with neo-Marxist social theory, and which finds its most
sophisticated representation in the work of Jurgen Habermas. See, e.g., J. HABERMAS, COM-
MUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (1979); J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1974). For a useful introduction, see Sumner, Law, Legitimation and The Advanced Capitalist
State: The Jurisprudence and Social Theory of Jurgen Habermas, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND
THE STATE 119 (D. Sugarman ed. 1983).
4. Reference here is specifically to the development of sociolinguistics as a methodology
for the analysis of the pragmatic and political contexts of language use. The best introductions
to the discipline can be found in B. BERNSTEIN, CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL (1977); LANGUAGE
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT (P. Gigliopoli ed. 1972). More recent work includes R. FOWLER, B. HODGE,
G. KRESS & T. TREW, LANGUAGE AND CONTROL (1979); W. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE (1982).
5. See A. GREIMAS, SEMIOTIQUE ET SCIENCES SociALEs (1976); G. KALINOWSKI, INTRODUC-
TION A LA LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE (1965); Oppenheim, Outline of a Logical Analysis of Law,
11 PHIL. SCI. 142 (1944).
6. Deconstruction refers to the method of textual analysis and interpretation developed by
J. Derrida and subsequently adopted as one of the defining terms of the post-structuralist
school of literary and social theory. See J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981) [hereinafter cited as J.
DERRIDA, POSITIONS]; J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978). In its broadest signification,
deconstruction may be defined as a method of reading texts in terms of their metaphysical
structuration. The text is analyzed in terms of its contradictions and lacunae so as to reveal
an open-ended plurality of meanings, none of which meanings is accounted more basic or more
"original" than any other.
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or with the even more frequently abused concept of nihilism,7 the definition
and heuristic function of the terms is precisely the object of conflict. There
is, however, a discernible convergence around issues of language and inter-
pretation, text and signification, and even though the meaning given to these
terms varies according to their context and, more crucially, according to the
political and discursive commitments of their users, they do at least form
an object of dialogue and dispute.
It is the purpose of the present paper to engage somewhat elliptically with
the disputes and disputed terms that the critical legal studies movement,
both in Europe and in America, currently aims to appropriate.8 It will do
so by presenting two crucially related arguments, the one historical and the
other somewhat more polemical. The historical argument draws upon the
concept of discourse9 to suggest that the legal concept of interpretation is
theological in its derivation and that it is unjustifiably authoritarian in its
practice. The exegetical and hermeneutic traditions of religious and legal
interpretation, it is argued, survive in and crucially continue to support the
persistent contemporary privileging of the law as definite written text, as
code (caudex) or unitary and univocal inscription of a sovereign will.
7. The term nihilism derives from the work of the German philosopher F. Nietzsche and
refers to a historically specific rejection of the dominant nineteenth-century Christian doctrines
of "unity," "purpose" and "being." Nihilism was not the rejection of all purposes and
meanings but simply an attack upon the values of a specific tradition and its concept of truth.
See F. NIETZSCHE, THE NVILL TO POWER (1909).
8. I do not intend to contribute to the growing number of bibliographies of critical legal
studies and related contributions. Of the available French literature, M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PuNISH (1979); P. LEGENDRE, JOUIR DE PoUvoxa (1976); J. LENOBLE & F. OST, DROIT,
MYTHE ET RAIsON (1981) are particularly recommended. A partial translation of a synoptic
article in this field is le Roy, Legal Paradigm and Legal Discourse, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 1
(1984). G. ROSE, THE DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM (1984) provides a stringent criticism of the claims
and epistemological foundations of the post-structuralist movement and method, although I
have argued elsewhere that her critique is mistaken. See Goodrich, Book Review, 12 J. L. &
Soc'Y 241 (1985). For further bibliographical details, see Goodrich, Language, Text and Sign
in the History of Legal Doctrine, in SEMIOTICS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 95 (D. Carzo & B. Jackson
eds. 1985); Goodrich, Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction, 11
J. L. & Soc'Y 173 (1984). Some of the issues dealt with here are touched upon in Hutchinson,
From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94 YALE L.J. 209 (1984); Singer,
The Player and the Cards, Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); see also Goodrich,
Law and Modernity (to be published in MOD. L. REv. vol. 48); Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
9. I refer specifically to the contemporary sociolinguistic definition of discourse as a set
of specifiable semantic regularities or as a "paraphrastic unity" associated with institutional
linguistic usages. Specific disciplines, genres and paradigms of knowledge develop and insti-
tutionalize specific "meaning effects" or accents according to the social and political position
and purposes of the administrative or institutional practices within which the discourse is to
be inscribed. See M. Paci-aux, LANGUAGE, SEM.ANTICS AND IDEOLOGY pt. III (1982); see also
M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (ed. 1972); V. VOLOSINOV, MARXISM AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1973); Goodrich, The Role of Linguistics in Legal Analysis,
47 MOD. L. REV. 523 (1984).
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The second argument or theme asserts that the essentially biblical attitude
towards the interpretation of legal texts has long outlived its linguistic and
political justifications. A close historical examination of the linguistic tra-
ditions and techniques invoked by critical legal studies suggests the possibility
of a theoretical foundation to legal interpretation in a rhetorical tradition
of linguistic and legal criticism. The rhetorical analysis of legal texts attempts
to break down the closure of legal knowledge and to open the monologue
of legal textual practice to the material economy of discourse and what
might be termed the politics of legal signification. Only when it is seen
explicitly as the symbolic signification of political authority or sovereign
power-as the rhetorically organized expression of authority-does it become
possible to treat legal regulation rationally as a form of collective existence,
as a series of motivated and structured choices as to the terms and content
of social life. Only as a historical and social knowledge-as opposed to a
strictly normative legal technique-can law interpretation and the legal text
come to be contested within the legal institution, and the ritual text and
ceremonial meaning be confronted by its substantive practices and called to
account for what it has done, for its practice.
I. TEXT AS SYSTEM; FROM EXEGESIS TO HERMENEUTICS
A useful if simple starting point is the premise that the object of inter-
pretation, be it word, sentence, text or discourse, is never something given
of itself, but always a construction, something posited or produced. Without
entering any of the disputes as to the units and levels of language, it can
be briefly observed that the word combines or unifies phonemes (the basic
units of sound), that the sentence unifies words (syntagms), that the text
orders and systematizes lower level groups of sentences, statements or ut-
terances, and that the discourse (as discursive order) coheres texts. In none
of these instances is the act of cohering or unifying entirely innocent; it
involves choices and the adoption of positions at the levels of lexicon (vo-
cabulary), syntax (sentence structure) and semantics (meaning). Particularly
in the case of the text and the discourse, though equally if less obviously
so at the level of lexicon and syntax, the object and outcome of interpretation
is the result of carefully regulated techniques and strategies of construction.
The object of interpretation is most commonly circumscribed, unified and
then given a meaning by means of one of several possible interpretative
methodologies which will not only define what it is that has to be interpreted
but will generally also legitimate or "authorize" the meaning produced. In
terms of legal interpretation, the historically dominant strategies are those
of exegesis and hermeneutics, and it would seem helpful to look at these
two methodologies in a certain amount of historical detail. From what
institutions do they derive, what is the motive underlying their use, and what
are their typical effects or functions?
[Vol. 61:315
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The earliest, most rigorous and also most persistent form of textual tech-
nique is that of exegesis, a strategy and technique of interpretation which
has frequently encompassed the entirety of practical legal method. In terms
of contemporary legal method, the exegetical technique is still the strongest
argument legitimizing (or authorizing) both text and interpretation, and for
that reason alone its details deserve careful examination and evaluation.
However, those details will be dealt with here not in the contemporary terms
of formalism, literalism and logical subsumption, but rather in the traditional
scholastic terms of "similitude," "concordance" and "gloss." The second
portion of this article will indicate the relation of the exegetical strategies
as outlined to contemporary techniques and their accompanying theoretical
justifications within the discourse of the philosophy of law.
A. Scripture
In its broadest meaning, exegesis is definable as a particular system of
authorizing, unifying, and interpreting or applying religious texts. In this
sense it operates a very specific system of privileges which function to produce
an authorized or "true," ritually validated, meaning and discourse. Because
religious (patristic) exegesis is not here the specific object of study, its
principal techniques of valorization can be dealt with relatively swiftly with-
out in any sense claiming to have provided anything more than an outline
and exemplification of theological, textual casuistry. First, religious meaning
is textually located. From the earliest rabbinical writings on biblical law to
the patristic exegesis of the first century A.D., religious meaning was con-
ceived as being written and as awaiting discovery through the technique of
authoritative commentary-commentary bound by and tied to the language
of the written text. The meaning discovered and settled by commentary was
the "true" meaning, the meaning accepted by the entirety of the church; in
one contemporary formulation, "this is an exegesis, which listens, through
the prohibitions, the symbols, the concrete images, through the whole ap-
paratus of Revelation to the word of God."'"
The privileging of the written-the hermeneutic autonomy of the text-
carries with it certain interesting supplementary devices. To privilege the
written text was only a part of the Oatristic strategy; it also entailed attributing
authority to the text and unifying its content. Although the religious text,
within the western tradition at least, is a specific graphic and physical entity-
it is epitomized by the ten commandments brought down from Mount Sinai
in the form of inscriptions upon stone tablets-the written text connotes
10. M. FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC XVii (1976). On religious exegesis more generally,
see ST. AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (ed. 1958); R. GRANT, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE (1963); G. ROSE, supra note 8; T. TODOROV, SYMBOLISM AND
INTERPRETATION (1983).
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more of an ideational or theoretic coherence than a purely physical one.
The unity of the code, of the written biblical law, is a function of power
and discipline, of the hierophantic (priestly) or oracular quality of the law
rather than simply being an internal quality of the text. Initially there is the
postulation that the text is significant, that for institutional and interpretative
purposes the text or series of texts are to form a single "Text," a system
of primary meanings which are, through authoritative commentary, to be
repeated and obeyed."
Second, following from the interpretative stature of the primary text, it
may be observed that the religious code is not simply the authoritative
creation of a textual system but it is also and perhaps more importantly the
creation of a discursive space. The religious hierarchy or the powers of the
established church seek, through the primary text, to map and control, to
organize and restrain, an analytical space, a discipline in the sense of doctrine
or teaching. The analytical space created by the code is that of repetition
and respect, of identity and reception produced through the social admin-
istration of the discourse, through the hierarchically organized relation of
priest or "knower" to hearer, rather than through any necessary internal
criteria within the text or discourse itself. The "religious" is located in the
material conditions of its enunciation, in the forms in which it is commu-
nicated, and in its transmission rather than its content:
[T]he dual figure of the priest and the hieroglyph occupies an exemplary
position ... bringing together the essence of social power qua power of
writing, or at least an essential moment of these powers and of what is
represented in them. And these two figures are inseparable; they belong
to one and the same system and are mutually constitutive. No priests
without a hieroglyphic writing, no hieroglyphics without a working pri-
esthood. Occupying the center within the succession of writing ... the
hieroglyph is the elementary milieu, the medium and general form of all
writing. 2
The creation of an analytic space by essentially external constraints upon
the enunciation and reception of religious dogma-the creation of a specific
and restricted auditory space-should not, however, detract from the internal
features of the religious code. Although there are clearly dangers in at-
tempting to generalize the different techniques and schools of patristic ex-
11. Foucault has written:
In short, I suspect one could find a sort of gradation between different kinds of
discourse within most societies: discourse "uttered" in the course of the day in
casual meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it;
and those forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain number of new
verbal acts, which are reiterated, transformed and discussed; in short, discourse
which is spoken and remains spoken . . . and remains to be spoken.
M. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 220.
12. Derrida, Scribble, 58 YALE FRENCH STUD. 116, 125 (1979); see also J. DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY pt. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY].
[Vol. 61:315
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egesis between the first and thirteenth centuries, there would appear to be
at least a superficial coherence to the strategy and method uniting the
exegetical text. Initially it should be noted that the text is a unity by virtue
of its source, the sovereign or divine intention which lies behind the biblical
text and awaits discovery by means of careful exegetical construction or
literary technique. The written word is, in Derrida's terms, the "logocentric"
representation of a prior presence, a prior speech. 3 The authorship of the
text is its unifying feature; it is also the guarantee of its validity and its
meaning. That its meaning is unitary and univocal as the Church requires
it to be is a product of the fact that the religious text is always to be
approached as a didactic and sacred document, as the source of both knowl-
edge and potential salvation, as the sole mode of study and aspiration. The
unitary source and unitary meaning as the doctrinally agreed "correct" or
"valid" meaning resulted in a number of elaborate and highly sophisticated
means of controlling polysemy within the religious text. The code is the
complete and consistent source of knowledge; it is, for political reasons
within the Church of Rome, a total or universal set of meanings applicable
throughout Christendom, and for such to be the case requires a highly
defined set of reductive textual methodologies. Textual meanings are to be
systematized throughout the entire code, and for this effect to be achieved
a very clear hierarchy of meanings must be established. For St. Augustine
and St. Thomas Aquinas the solution was in principle relatively simple. They
both, though in somewhat different ways, introduced a conception of biblical
language as a primarily denotative or referential language: the sign is in
principle a name for a thing, and where it fails to name some entity directly,
according to St. Augustine, it must be corrected "partly with reference to
a knowledge of languages, and partly with reference to a knowledge of
things." 4
For Aquinas as well, signs had a fundamental or literal meaning which
took precedence over other levels of allegorical, moral and anagogical mean-
ing. The plurality of meanings was thus to be drastically restricted; there
was ultimately, in principle or doctrine, only one meaning. At the level of
the lexicon this meant a nominalized approach to metaphor and a strictly
reductive approach to other forms of variation, figuration or ambiguity of
meaning: "nothing necessary for faith is contained under the spiritual sense
that is not openly conveyed through the literal meaning elsewhere."' 5 At the
semantic level the techniques are more complex; the universality of the
13. The term "logocentric" derives from J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 12,
and refers to the embeddedness of western philosophy in a metaphysics of presence-in theories
of meaning which depend upon some concept of a central, fixed "originary" meaning or truth.
14. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 10, at 50.
15. 1 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 18 (ed. 1920); see also Jackson, The Ceremonial
and the Judicial: Biblical Law as Sign and Symbol, 30 J. STUDY OLD TESTAMENT 25 (1984).
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biblical meaning has to be replicated intertextually through the rigorous
search for concordances or equivalences between different elements of the
text. Not only, in other words, is the plurality of lexical meanings to be
drastically reduced or controlled by reference to a doctrinally imposed,
literal/denotative meaning, but the larger units of language or discourse-
sentences, discrete utterarices and isolable propositions-are to be made
semantically consistent throughout the text. In the last analysis, the signified
is to be privileged over the signifier; the doctrinal or "spiritual" is to be
preferred to or is to redefine the literal meaning where the literal meaning
appears to conflict either with other sections of the text or with a doctrinal
truth such as, for instance, St. Augustine's privileging of charity as the prime
virtue of the Christian faith. The semantic strategy is one of closure or
reduction: it seeks to impose restrictions, to valorize, certain semantic as-
sociations while excluding others. Meanings should be clear, the faith should
be available or at least decided by the authorities (auctoritates) of the Church
or of the greatest number of churches, if truth and error, faith and heresy,
were to be distinguished and their consequences made plain.16
B. Gloss
The relation between the religious and the legal text or code is one of
close if not exact equivalence. In terms of external, institutional support or
traditional auctoritates, the links between law and religion were, from the
earliest days of the western legal tradition, of extreme proximity if not
identity. Not only were the early jurists, with the sole exception of the
forensic rhetoricians of classical Greece and of the Roman Republic, a
priesthood, but jurisprudence or the study of law was itself classically defined
as a "knowledge of things divine and human."'' 7 The correlation between
religious and legal power can be traced in external terms through to the
contemporary professions via a continuous process of secularization which
has merely replaced an explicit priesthood of pontifices (pontiffs), or sac-
erdotes legum (priests of the law) with other forms of legal privilege (hon-
estiores) and with professional "knowers," and has correspondingly replaced
the natural law justifications of legal sovereignty (as God's law or as "divine
right") with an ideology that naturalizes the new law tables, the hierarchy
of sources, the statute book and judgments.' 8
16. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 10, at 12; see also U. Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE 147-63 (1984).
17. DIGEST, Pt. 1, bk. 1, tit. 1 (see infra note 22).
18. For initial analyses of the contemporary profession, see F. BURTON & P. CARLEN,
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ch.4 (1979); P. CARLEN, MAGISTRATES' JUSTICE (1976); R. DINGWALL & P.
LEWIS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS ch.5 (1983); THE POLITICS OF LAW ch.3 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 660-70 (1983).
For historical arguments as to secularization, see J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968);
P. LEGENDRE, L'AmOUR DU CENSEUR (1974); W. ULLMANN, LAW AND PouTIcs (1975).
[Vol. 61:315
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Granted the contextual character of all commupnication, it is of utmost
importance not to lose sight of the hierarchically organized "subject posi-
tionings" between which communication occurs. The point is not simply
that society organizes and authorizes discourses, that speakers are qualified
and topics of speech restricted according to predetermined institutional spaces.
The socially designated status and propriety of the speech is frequently a
matter of its place and appropriateness to that place, be it bar, bench, pulpit,
podium or political rostrum.' 9 At the same time, however, the external
constraints upon speaker and speech are also frequently reflected in the
manner in which the text is constructed, both in its intratextual ordering
and in the interpretative techniques used to reconstruct the speaker's meaning
in or behind the text.20 Legal exegesis provides, if anything, an even clearer,
more concise and more functional example of the relation between "hier-
oglyph" and power, between writing and authority, between institutional
goals and discourse, than even the religious code can claim.
In the face of problems of periodization and of conflict between different
schools of classical exegesis-those of the glossators, commentators, hu-
manistic legal philologists and lafer the exegetes of the nineteenth-century
codes-it is necessary to make certain drastic excisions. 21 Rather than discuss
issues of method raised by earlier traditions of interpretatio and earlier codes,
this article shall concentrate instead on the more politically crucial period
of the reception of the Corpus furis Civiis22 in medieval Europe, and par-
ticularly the Italian and French glossatorial schools of the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries. The reason for this choice is both pragmatic and strategic.
The period in question is in many ways exemplary of legal method and legal
communication as such: in an albeit extreme form, the glossators devised
and consolidated the specificity of law as a discourse in a manner that is
still of the utmost contemporary relevance.
19. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980); G. THERBORN, THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER 77-89 (1980).
20. On the question of the inside and outside of discourse more generally, see J. DERRIDA,
OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 12, at 27, 44; J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS, supra note 6, at 37;
Brown & Cousins, The Linguistic Fault, 9 EcON. & Soc'Y 251 .(1980).
21. On historical issues, see P. STEIN, REGULAE IURIS (1966); W. ULLMANN, supra note 18;
A. WATSON, THE CIwL LAW TRADITION (1981); Legendre, Recherches sur les Commentaires
Pre-Accursiens, 33 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE DRorr 353 (1965); see also J. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN
AND THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND HISTORY (1966);
M. VAN DE KERCHOVE, L'INTERPRETATION EN DRorr (1978). On the more general political
history of the glossators and the university law curriculum, see D. KELLEY, THE BEGINNING OF
IDEOLOGY (1981); W. ONG, RAmIus: METHOD, AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE (1958); 1 Q. SKINNER,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978). For later exegetical schools, see P.
GOODRICH, READING THE LAW ch.5 (1986); C. PERELMAN, LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE (1976).
22. The Corpus Juris Civilis is the vast compilation of Roman law ordered by the Eastern
Roman emperor Justinian in 527 A.D. and published in 532-535 A.D. Compiled by a specially
established commission headed by Tribonian, the Corpus Juris is divided into four parts, the
Code, the Digest, the Institutes and the Novels.
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The compilation of the Corpus Iuris at the command of the Emperor
Justinian during the third decade of the sixth century is an event of such
historical and political significance that it is hard to circumscribe. 23 As an
exercise in the codification of substantive law or of an extant and enforceable
body of rules, the Corpus luris was anomalous even at the time of its original
compilation. While the compilers were explicitly directed to avoid contra-
dictions, repetitions and archaisms, the very nature of this vast project was,
in terms of available materials and knowledge, never likely to produce a
coherent or consistent body of contemporary rules from the scattered and
fragmented literary remains of a western Roman Empire that Constantine
had abandoned over a century earlier. The paradox instituted by the pub-
lication of the Corpus Iuris is in many respects the same as that which
accompanies its reception in medieval Europe. The paradox is that of how
and why the very basis of the western legal tradition and method should
take the form of a vast compilation of foreign legal scripts written in an
alien language and directly applicable only to a past culture. The question
to be posed is: what lies behind a singularly remarkable philological and
legal event-the rediscovery of a set of initially incomplete manuscripts, five
centuries after their original publication, in a library in Pisa? As one recent
commentator has stated:
To say that law was taught and studied in the West as a distinct science
at a time when the prevailing legal orders were only beginning to be
clearly differentiated from politics and religion, raises a number of ques-
tions. What did the first law teachers teach? ...
The answer surely sounds curious to modern ears. The law first taught
and studied systematically in the West was not the prevailing law; it was
the law contained in an ancient manuscript which had come to light in
an Italian library towards the end of the 1 th century. The manuscript
reproduced the enormous collection of legal materials which had been
compiled under the Roman Emperor Justinian in about 534 AD-over
five centuries earlier.2
Assuming that the general features of the reception of the Corpus Iuris are
by now established, 25 it is possible to concentrate in greater detail upon the
methodological and linguistic peculiarities that the reception produced, a
task which is best approached through the analysis of the exegetical concept
of the source of law. If the source of law is defined initially in broad terms
23. See A. WATSON, supra note 21; see also H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983); W.
ULLMANN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF LAW (1946); A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE
AND AMBIGUITY (1984). For a more detailed study and references, see T. HONORE, TRIEONIAN
(1978).
24. Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894, 898 (1977).
25. See, e.g., id.; see also P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1929); A.
WATSON, supra note 21.
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as that which gives validity and legitimacy to a particular form of regulation
or discipline, then, in the case of the method of exegesis, it is easy enough
to extrapolate from arguments as to sources to the related issues of the
linguistic and communicational character of the established sources of law,
the specific textual and doctrinal qualities of the compilation in question.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the reception of the Corpus is not
so much the religious fervor with which a series of archaic and arcane texts
were seized upon by the first school of glossators, but rather the even more
striking longevity of the techniques which these early glossators developed
for explaining, systematizing and teaching the text. In many ways those
methods are still the principal tenets of legal interpretation, and the linguistics
that such techniques imply are still to be found implicit within much con-
temporary philosophy of law. It would seem indisputable in such circum-
stances that the techniques satisfied a social need or performed a material
function, that they captured an essential element of what is in hermeneutics
termed the "spirit" or "idea" of law. 26 That function, as expressed earlier
in relation to the religious code, is that of creating an analytical space for
legal discipline or order, of setting in motion the conditions for a specifically
legal discourse; it is "a monumental design for a whole society ' ' 27 based
upon legality rather than upon any more explicit justificatory argument,
upon form and not upon any particular quality of content.
The first move in an exegetical strategy may be characterized, both his-
torically and analytically, as that of postulating a sovereign source of law.
Just as it is the hidden presence of God's word that makes the numerous
books of the Bible a single text and a single doctrine, so also the disparate
segments of the Corpus luris become a single text or textual system by virtue
of their direct relation to the Emperor Justinian. The analogy can usefully
be developed further. Certainly Justinian was not the direct author of the
codification, but the codification was compiled and the law was rationalized
at his explicit command. It was for essentially political reasons, however,
that the glossators sought to emphasize rather than to question the Corpus
luris as the expression of a single sovereign will. In the emerging Italian
city states of the twelfth century and in France, it was not simply the Roman
law that the glossators resurrected, but it was also, and perhaps more
significantly, the idea of empire and of imperium28 that was recovered as
well and traditionally expressed in the maxim "unum esse jus, cum unum
sit imperium. "29 The Corpus Iuris represented a particular kind of political
26. See Betti, Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften, in
J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 51 (1980).
27. J. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 124; see also Thomas, Le Langue du Droit Romain,
ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DRorr 103 (1974).
28. Imperial, governmental or legal (magisterial) power.
29. "The unity of the law is founded upon the unity of the empire."
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order or sovereignty and would, with little adaptation, equally well serve
the propagation of an imperial or politically unifying theme in the fragmented
west of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as it had satisfied the ideological
needs of Justinian as universal lord of the earlier eastern Roman Empire. 0
The Corpus luris had the status of lex sacra (sacred law) for ideological and
political reasons; its universality was directly related to the concept and
extension of empire based upon the model of imperial Rome or sacrum
Romanum imperium (holy Roman Empire).
More important, however, than the postulation of an explanation for the
status of the Corpus 1uris is an analysis of the exegetical techniques that
constituted the text as a system and as statutory law in the original sense
of statutum-that which is set up or authoritatively laid down. Just as the
Church had attributed to the Bible the status of truth as being the inherent
property of the word of God, so the glossators based the entire apparatus
or technique of exegesis upon the truth or reason of the code. The code as
written law was to be treated in its entirety as ratio scripta (written reason),
as the expression of a divine and universal reason imbued with the status
of sacred law (lex sacra). Not only did the code contain the complete law,
not only was it exhaustive, but it was also perceived to be a rational unity,
a logically coherent whole which, by virtue of the eminent qualities of its
author and the uniquely logical character of his historic will, was perceived
to require faultless obedience and application.3 The text became a primal
discourse which, for reasons of its source, was to be treated as, or better,
made to appear to be faultlessly authoritative.
The specific techniques of exegesis build upon the ideological requirements
of universality and reason.3 2 Just as the ideology of the source of law
has the effect of transforming successive historical legislators into one
"pontifical" legislator, so also it transforms scattered texts into a single
Text. This Text is implemented by a rigorous method and its presup-
positions are developed virtually indefinitely by reference to its own
internal logic; it thus extends itself stage by stage and can claim finally
to have regulated everything under its unified categories.3
A science of the text, a science of the order and logic of the written law,
is developed in the diverse forms of the method of the gloss: "the work of
applying grammatical, etymological and logical techniques to standardize
and adapt the ancient texts. Grammar, lexicology and logic are all required
30. See Q. SKINNER, supra note 21; W. ULLMANN, supra note 18, at 83.
31. See, e.g., P. LEGENDRE, JOUIR DE PouvoIR (1976); J. LENOBLE & F. OsT, supra note
8, at 219.
32. H. KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW (1969) provides the
best introduction to the methods and texts of the glossators. For further references to sources,
see Q. SKINNER, supra note 21; W. ULLMANN, supra note 18.
33. J. LENOBLE & F. OST, supra note 8, at 227.
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to function in a unitary fashion so as to control the movement towards the
sense (the ratio) of which the Text is the bearer." ' 34 The key to the glossatorial
method, however, is not so much its analytic character per se-its rigorous
pursuit of "grammatical" meanings-as its use of varying forms of that
method to create and maintain an orthodoxy based upon the integrity of
the text and fidelity to the general method of exegetical restrictions upon
interpretation and justification. In many senses the function of transmission
outweighs any particular form of exegetical method, and where major doc-
trinal debates have emerged they have used arguments as to method precisely
to reinstate the "original" or "true" text. Luther, and the Reformation in
general, 5 sought a return to the unadorned biblical text, free from the
commentaries and dogma of the Roman Church. Similarly, the commentators
or post-glossators, in challenging the earlier glossatorial school, argued that
the growing apparatus of glosses-of notabilia (summaries), distinctiones
(classifications), brocardica (maxims), quaestiones (problems of law), and
later regulae (principles), materiae (introductions) and summae titulorum
(synopses of titles)3'-were threatening to obscure the original Text and
the original meaning or will which underlay it. The commentators sought
to recover the true Text, to restore the integrity of the sovereign word, and
the later humanist challenge to both the early schools of exegesis took a
very similar form. For the legal humanists, however, the Text itself, the
Corpus Iuris, was to be questioned philologically and was to be replaced by
a prior, stronger Text, the surviving documents of Roman law (ius commune)
itself. The humanists were concerned to recover and to transmit the original
text or sources of the ius commune (civil law) rather than to rely upon their
secondary representation in Justinian's compilation. Crucially, however, the
change in the object of interpretation was not to be matched by any cor-
responding revision of the primary status of the texts interpreted nor in the
function of the interpretative method, that of restoring the legal orthodoxy
and reinstating the genuine classical "idea" or "spirit" of the law,
7 of
returning to an authentic or "true Latinity" (Bud6) by means of a phil-
ological restoration of the real textual monuments of Roman law.
While there are obvious dangers and clearly much scope for error as to
historical detail, it might nevertheless be useful to sketch the general form
of the gloss as intratextual technique before moving on to summarize the
later hermeneutic inheritance of, and dependence upon, this early exegesis.
34. P. LEGENDRE, supra note 18, at 94.
35. For an account of the principle of sola scriptura, see D. KELLEY, supra note 21; 2 Q.
SKINNER, supra note 21.
36. For useful discussions and references, see J. FRANKLIN, supra note 21; H. KANTOROWICZ,
supra note 32; P. STEIN, supra note 21. The object of the attack was the monumental Glossa
Ordinaria of Accursius, written and circulated around 1250.
37. See D. KELLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP (1970); see also
sources cited supra note 36.
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Roughly in the order of their textual importance they may be listed as
follows.
(1) The tenet of doctrine. Reference here is to the manner in which the
characteristic form, and to some extent even content, of the primary Text
is mapped in advance or is already known to the priesthood of its interpreters.
Theological and legal dogmatics predetermine the source, the authorship and
authority of the unified Text as system and establish in advance the detailed
"rules of recognition" for the validated discourse: "questions of heresy and
unorthodoxy in no way. arise out of fanatical exaggeration of doctrinal
mechanisms; they are a fundamental part of them." 3 St. Augustine, for
example, remarked on several occasions that our path through the gospels
is marked not by visibility or sight but by faith;3 9 the literal sign is distin-
guished from the figurative by reference to the creed of charity or, more
generally, by reference to the established authority of the church. Legally
comparable textual mechanisms are found in the introduction to the Corpus
Juris but, more importantly, are essential facets of the glossatorial technique.
The form of the text is that of the complete law-it is exhaustive of all the
legal possibilities-and in terms of its content, it is free of contradiction
and repetition. No two statements, claimed Accursius, are "contraria" (op-
posed) or "similia" (the same). In short, the text is unified in advance; it
represents a very peculiar and very special object of knowledge, and it is
constituted as sacred writ (something written and something sent) to be
handed on under very carefully controlled circumstances.
(2) The tenet of legality or principle of restrictive interpretation and com-
mentary. Particularly in the case of legal interpretation the stress upon the
written source of any rule application or judgment is doctrinally extremely
strong. Citation and quotation are the standard material of legal study and
legal judgment alike, and even within the common law tradition the most
usual form of justificatory argument is reference to "old law" and to its
scriptural forms in the plea roll (established pleadings) writs and later in
precedent or statute. 40 The more general purpose of the concept of legality,
however, is definitional. The written law defines all social relations and
resolves all social conflicts by reference to the legal Text. The validity of
the judgment is also its justification, its proximity to the literal meaning of
the rule. A brief reference can then be made to the general form of legality
as a textual methodology, referred to in the Corpus Juris and adopted by
38. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 226; see also R. DEBRAY, supra note 1. For contemporary
debates as to "recognition," see B. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (1985). For
an interesting account of linguistics, which deals with this specific issue in terms of the
"preconstructed" in discourse, see M. PECHEUX, supra note 9.
39. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 10.
40. See P. STEIN, supra note 21; Kantorowicz, The Quaestiones Disputatae of the Glossators,
16 REVUE D'HISTOIRE Du DROIT 1 (1939). The issue of the partial distinctiveness of the common
law is beyond the scope of this article.
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the glossators, and indeed by Bracton and the early literary exponents of
the common law, as that of "procedere ad similia" (proceeding by analogy,
or from like to like). Where St. Augustine refers to "similitude" as a principal
feature of the gospels, and St. Thomas to the textual production of "con-
cordances," the authoritative commentary takes a legal form in the glos-
satorial use of restricted analogies. Interpretation begins with interpretatio
declaritiva (signiflicatio, or lexical gloss) and moves with great caution towards
comprehensio legis, the ascertainment of the intention and consequent scope
of the norm (mens legis).
(3) Unity of meaning and univocality of language form a further tenet of
the glossatorial technique. It is essential to dogma or doctrine that the rule-
the normative resolution to a dispute-is received not as the invention of
the glossator but rather as the restoration of the text by means of strictly
logical techniques: "in the epiphany of the law the jurist counts for noth-
ing. ' 41 The text has only one meaning, and the specific rule is univocal: the
signifier is the neutral medium of the prior signified, the written represen-
tation of a prior speech. At the level of glossatorial technique the unity of
meaning and univocality of language were the principal object of a diversity
of procedures. Without entering into details, it can be noted that the op-
eration of the marginal gloss was in fact highly sophisticated. The reading
(legere) of the text would take the form of a very specific order of procedures
leading from an introductory contextualization (notabilia/materia) to a read-
ing of the text itself which would examine both the terms of the rule in
question and the rule itself in the light of their coherence with other instances
or usages elsewhere in the text (connotare) and also, as time passed, their
consonnance with other glosses. Throughout the endlessly complicated array
of textual mechanisms of explanation, the impetus was always the same
mixture of reductionism and of order being placed upon the chaos of social
relations.
(4) Finally, the tenet of resolution. Whatever the difficulties of procedure
and of reading, the text must be made to speak to, and further to resolve,
the issue (either quaestio or causa) before the student or judge. The exegesis
of the glossators and of the Renaissance made considerable academic play
upon the fact that legal problems were resoluble problems, and the method.
of disputatio (scholarly debate on moot points of law) in particular represents
an early version of the "problem of law" as a discrete and resolvable legal
issue. Law indeed is differentiated from other discourses precisely by the
strictly normative character of its texts and the consequently exhaustive pre-
41. P. LEGENDRE, supra note 18, at 96. For an earlier statement of a similar principle, the
Dean of the Faculty of Law at Paris, wrote in 1857, "the whole body of statute law, the spirit
as well as the letter of the law, with a broad account of its principles and the most complete
treatment of the consequences which flow from it, but nothing but statute law: such has been
the motto of the teachers of the Code Napoleon." C. PERELMAN, supra note 21, at 23.
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cognition or foreknowledge that the jurist has of legal answers to legal
questions. The text provides for everything in advance; the text needs merely
to be repeated and applied, comprehended and taught. For the glossators it
was never necessary to leave the boundaries of the text. Law was tradition
and monument, authority and meahing; it was to be preserved and tran-
scribed, invoked and handed down; it came from above and was applied
below.
C. Tradition
The importance of treating the law as something to be preserved and
taught-the medieval dialectic of doctrina (teaching) and disciplina (learn-
ing)-meant that an important aspect of the post-glossator's role was that
of the custodianship of tradition. Where tradition was threatened either by
inaccuracy, failure of memory or loss of relevance, the tools or techniques
of recollection become important objects of study in their own right. Legal
humanism in particular was meticulous in its attention to philological detail.
The work of the philologists indeed has an immense significance in its own
right and, via the work of the Grammarians and of de Saussure, 42 can claim
a relatively direct relation to contemporary linguistics and certain versions
of semiotics. In the present context, however, the significance of tradition
and of the textual bearers of tradition have a more direct relevance in terms
of the much more contemporary justification provided for exegetical strat-
egies of religious and legal interpretation in terms of hermeneutics.43 Although
it is not here possible to deal with hermeneutics in any detail, a brief analysis
of the fundamentally exegetical character of hermeneutics can bring to light
certain further features of the conception of law as a textual system.
In its contemporary Germanic derivation in the nineteenth-century work
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey,"4 hermeneutics provides exegesis with a seem-
ingly modern philosophical justification in the philosophy of understanding.
More important, however, than the claims made by the theologian Schleier-
42. With regard to the Grammarians, see the classic text of C. LANCELOT & A. ARNAULD,
A GENERAL AND RATIONAL GRAMMAR (ed. 1968); see also F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS (ed. 1966).
43. The classic modern text on hermeneutics is H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1979);
within the Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence the term "hermeneutic" has been used
infrequently and inconsistently up until the past decade. Concern with law and language is still
somewhat of a peripheral interest though we now find the term "hermeneutic" occasionally
debated. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, POLITICAL JUDGES AND THE RULE OF LAW (1977); LAW, MORALITY
AND SOCmITY ch. 1 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
THEORY app. (1978); THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION (W. Mitchell ed. 1983).
44. F. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTIK (ed. 1959). See generally R. PALMER, HERMENEUTCS:
INTERPRETATION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMACHER, DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER AND GADAMER (1969); H.
RICKMAN, MEANING IN HISTORY (1961).
[Vol. 61:315
SEMIOTICS AND THE LA W
macher as to the scope and theoretical character of a general hermeneutics, 45
is the historical context and the textual practice that developed within reli-
gious, and especially legal, hermeneutics. Far from being in any open or
dialogic sense a philosophy of understanding, hermeneutics was a discipline
of strictly textual interpretation which reinvoked the traditional exegetical
concepts of source, intentionality and unity of meaning to propose histor-
ically validated or correct interpretations. Hermeneutics, which Schleier-
macher defined as the "art of avoiding misunderstandings," and Dilthey as
an attempt to "understand the author better than he understands himself, ' 46
was itself a reaction to the breakdown of the classical tradition-the late
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century loss of faith in unitary
meanings and the apparent decline in relevance of the humanist values.
Dilthey is quite explicit that the hermeneutic method is doctrinal and political:
"it is the strange fate of hermeneutics ... [that] it only gains recognition
when there is a movement among historians which considers understanding
individual historical manifestations an urgent matter for scholarship, " 47 that
is, for theological or jurisprudential study.
The first moment of hermeneutic interpretation can be termed that of
historical recovery or the preservation of a threatened tradition, a tenet
which gains a very precise and illuminating definition in the work of Gad-
amer; hermeneutics is the doctrine of translation.4 Etymologically, of course,
the word hermeneutics derives from the Greek myth of Hermes, the herald
of the gods. Hermes was the messenger of the gods who would translate
and communicate an original and divine speech to its human audience. The
foreign and strange signs and symbols of the gods had to be translated into
familiar, recognizable and intelligible human speech. Gadamer, however,
develops this process of transmission into a principle of interpretation as
translation in which essential oppositions are constituted between the divine
and the human, the foreign and the familiar, the written and the spoken,
and lastly and most broadly, the past and the present. The notion of trans-
lation is pivotal and has a peculiar relevance to legal hermeneutics.
A primary though little studied feature of the lav is its language. 49 Both
in the civil and the common law traditions, the language of the law has
been a foreign or alien one. In the case of civil law the language was that
of classical Latin until the mid-seventeenth century. From the first vernacular
45. A useful guide to the original texts is to be found in H. SCHNADELBACH, PHILOSOPHY
IN GERmANY, 1831-1937 (1984); see also T. TODOROV, supra note 10.
46. W. DILTHEY, SELECTED WRITINGS 258-60 (1976).
47. Id. at 261.
48. H. GADAMER, supra note 43, at 147.
49. For useful works on the common law dimension of this problem, see Cairns, Blackstone,
An English Institutist, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 318 (1984); Shoeck, Rhetoric and Law in
Sixteenth-Century England, 50 STUD. PHILOLOGY 110 (1953); Woodbine, The Language of
English Law, 18 SPECULum 395 (1943).
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institutional works of the seventeenth century to the present day, the con-
ceptual structure, key terms and above all the method and style of the legal
discourse remain both latinized and, in sociolinguistic terms, alien. In the
common law tradition Latin was only very briefly the principal legal lan-
guage, and it was largely displaced in the thirteenth century by law French
which, together with certain Latin relics, remains an important constituent
of legal language. Hermeneutics, for Gadamer, recollects and interprets the
documentary expressions of religious and legal culture. It has the power to
assign historical significance and to restore original meanings:
[A]I that no longer expresses itself in and through its own world-that
is, everything that is handed-down, whether art or other spiritual creations
of the past, law, religion, philosophy and so forth-is estranged from
its original meaning and depends for its unlocking and communication
[upon hermeneutics]. 10
Hermeneutics translates and reinstates meanings that are unavailable to com-
mon knowledge or to ordinary language, that were spoken in the past but
remain to control the present, that were written and require contemporary
interpretation. For Dilthey, history is itself a great dark book-"the collected
work of the human spirit, written in the languages of the past" 5 1-and
Gadamer too proposes the exemplary foreign character of writing: "the full
hermeneutical significance of the fact that tradition is linguistic in nature is
clearly revealed when the tradition is a written one .... [The] written texts
present the real hermeneutical task. ' '52 The reasoning behind this emphasis
upon the written sign and upon meaning as paradigmatically a textual phe-
nomenon is the equation of the written with the foreign or strange-if not
always with the divine then at least with the powerful. The written text, for
hermeneutics just as much as for the earlier exegesis, is simply the repre-
sentation of a prior speech; it is the sign of the authorial intention: "[t]he
sign language of writing refers back to the actual language of speech....
All writing is ... a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be
transformed back into speech and meaning. ' -3 Hermeneutics, in other words,
will provide the rules for rediscovering the "full speech" or self-presence of
the rational author or valid source of the text.
The notion of interpreting the written by reference to its concealed source-
a prior unity or speech-effectively reinstates the humanist claim that there
is always a unitary meaning to the text, by virtue, if by nothing else, simply
of its being treated as text in the strongest sense of the term. The text is
here again a system; it is gospel or law which will provide the basis of
50. H. GADAMER, supra note 43, at 147.
51. W. DILTHEY, supra note 46.
52. H. GADAMER, supra note 43, at 351-52.
53. Id. at 354. On the linguistic aspects to this position, see J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY,
supra note 12; see also J. DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 307 (1982).
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commentary either as preaching or judgment. Certainly there are numerous
refinements and subtleties occasioned by the renewed theoretical tradition
of exegesis as hermeneutics: a greater attention to historical semantics, to
grammatical detail and indeed to problems of interpretation as application
or judgment (subtilitas applicandO, but the goals of valid interpretation and
of objective textual meaning remain constant. The text must be made to
speak to the present, and while hermeneutic interpretation actively transmits
the historical meaning to its contemporary significance, hermeneutics itself
is simply a normative discipline erecting the contours and concepts by which
we come to know the objectivity of meaning and the rational value of
tradition.14 In the terminology of Emilio Betti, a leading contemporary
scholar of legal hermeneutics, hermeneutics establishes the canons of inter-
pretation; it provides normative techniques which will successfully restrict
interpretation to the text and will eventually provide an institutionally sat-
isfactory meaning for the text. By the essentially traditional means of re-
construction and integration, the text as system is reestablished or, in Betti's
terms, the canon of the "coherence of meaning, the principle of totality"
is vindicated: "the meaning of the whole has to be derived from its individual
elements, and an individual element has to be understood by reference to
the comprehensive, penetrating whole of which it is a part."55
II. TEXT AS SOCIAL FUNCTION: FROM RHETORIC TO DIscOURsE
The two major traditions of hermeneutics-those of theological and jur-
isprudential interpretation-were products of an analogous impetus or ide-
ological motive. What united them was the attempt to revive textual traditions
which, while still comparatively well known, had lost or obscured their
original meanings. Their meanings had become alien or unavailable, as, for
instance, was the case with the understanding of the Bible and Luther's
determination to reassert principles of sola scriptura (the text alone) and
sensus literalis (literal meaning) against the dogma of the Roman tradition.
It has been the implicit argument of the preceding survey of traditions of
interpretation that a similar sense of threat to dogma and doctrine lies behind
the more contemporary reawakening of jurisprudential concern with her-
meneutics. Where critical legal studies is genuinely and substantively critical,
it forces the legal institution to reopen the methodological baggage of exe-
gesis, philology and hermeneutics as the justificatory techniques for judgment
according to the "rule of law." The epithets and labels of dispute-those,
54. Contemporary philosophy of law certainly treats legal hermeneutics in this sense. Ac-
cording to N. MacCormick, the hermeneutic viewpoint (or internal aspect of legal rules) entails
both a cognitive and a volitional element: the end state produced by the rule is viewed as desirable
by the rule user. N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
55. Betti, supra note 26, at 59.
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for example, of objectivism and subjectivism, positivism and nihilism, se-
miotics and psychoanalysis-have a certain polemical novelty in the legal
sphere. This debate, however, is in itself frequently in danger of wearily
repeating the arguments and assumptions-political and linguistic-of nu-
merous earlier controversies where the most noticeable result of the challenge
to the legal institution and its textual system had merely been that it served
to reinstate fidelity to the text and the accompanying procedures and prin-
ciples of scriptural repetition. Rather than enter those debates here or en-
deavor to provide a more detailed critique of the persistence of exegesis,
this article shall instead refer briefly to alternative issues and to a relatively
obscure tradition of intepretation, rhetoric. The motive underlying such a
reference is not that of invoking a further esoteric body of knowledge and
technique but rather that of raising the possibility of a different terrain of
debate in which the epistemological antinomies of reason and nihilism,
sociality and solipsism, discipline and discretion are no longer the sole guiding
choices for the interpretation of legal text and legal power.
The interpretative tradition which comes closest to the aims and aspirations
of critical legal studies is neither humanist nor dialectic, neither structuralist
nor semiotic, but rhetorical. The tradition in question is to some extent the
excluded figure in the post-medieval academic curriculum and a few com-
ments upon its history as a discipline are necessary. 6 The earliest explicit
study of legal argument and legal judgment was linguistic; it dates back to
the fifth century B.C. and takes the form of technical or forensic manuals
associated initially with the work of Corax and Tisias of Syracuse." The
manuals classified and illustrated the principal categories and techniques of
"effective argument" or "persuasive speech" before the newly constituted
democratic juries of Sicily and Greece. The conceptualization of the discipline
is best represented in the work of Aristotle, and it was to a large extent an
Aristotelian conception of rhetorical study and criticism which was developed
by the Roman forensic orators Cicero and Quintilian. It is the conception
of language, text and technique in the synthetic works of Aristotle and
Cicero that will be analyzed here and distinguished, where necessary, from
the later and much weaker traditions of rhetorical study associated partic-
ularly with the Renaissance and, as the other of logic or the "science" of
reason, with the rationalism of the eighteenth century.
56. Among the more interesting discussions are J. DERRIDA, supra note 53, at 207; T.
EAGLETON, WALTER BENJAMIN (1981); G. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC (1980); M. PECHEUX,
supra note 38; T. TODOROV, THEORIES OF THE SYMBOL (1982). For a historical account of the
jurisprudential relevance of rhetoric, see Goodrich, Rhetoric as Jurisprudence, 4 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984).
57. In the traditional accounts reported by Plato and Aristotle, rhetoric was the invention
of a teacher, Corax of Syracuse, and found its original use in arguments as to property rights
before the legal assemblies of the newly established democracies in Sicily and Greece. ARISTOTLE,
RHETORIC bk.1; PLATO, GORGIAS.
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Long before the emergence of any class or profession of lawyers, rheto-
ricians studied the workings and practices of the legal assemblies (agora) as
part of a general study of the politics and power of public speech. Rhetoric
was secular in its origins and popular, rather than hieratic, in its practice.
It was concerned not with prior truth or revelation but rather with practical
criticism and the relationship of arguments used and actions proposed to
the needs of the immediate historical community. The first tenet of rhetorical
interpretation can thus be broadly phrased as follows. In definitional terms
it can be observed that rhetoric is defined as an explicitly political form of
study. For Aristotle, rhetoric studies contingent (historical) human behavior
and is consequently "a branch of the science dealing with behavior, which
it is right to call political." '58 For Cicero, similarly, rhetoric is defined as
civilis ratio, (political reason), and for both Cicero and Quintilian, rhetoric
deals with "speaking well in civil matters. ' 59 More profoundly, the rhetorical
method of study itself ensures a historical and political character to inter-
pretation and argument. For Aristotle, the political character of speech is
contained in the very notion of genres of rhetoric, genres which are defined
by reference to institutional factors relating to the speaker and the place of
speech. In essence, there are for Aristotle three spheres of public speech,
each directly related to the function of the assembly being addressed and
the institutionally determined goal of the speaker: policy, justice and honor
being the respective aims of the deliberative, forensic and the epideictic
assemblies. That speech orientates the public sphere is even clearer with
Cicero who devotes considerable attention to the related conceptions of
inventio-the "discovery" of arguments or starting points for argument-
and loci communes-the subjects of argument or topics, arguments tradi-
tionally associated with specific objects of speech. 60
Invention is the first stage of the classical rhetorical process. The rhetorical
discovery of arguments is social, according to Cicero, not simply because
the topics of argument were drawn from the realms of public discourse-
each genre or institution has its specific topics-but more precisely because
rhetoric was the study of appropriate (ethical) or useful (political) speech.
Very briefly, there was a conceptual or occasionally philosophical dimension
to rhetoric which located arguments in relation to the past purposes and
future needs of the community. It was not simply that the speech was viewed
as functional-that it accompanied and guided institutional practices-but
also that it was by its very nature tied to the community, that thought was
58. ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 1356a.
59. For discussions of the definition and scope of rhetoric, see CICERO, DE INVENTIONE
bk. 1.1-5 (eloquentiae studium); QUINTILUAN, INSTIUTIO ORATORIA bk.3.6 (bene dicendi scientia).
60. CICERO, Topics 2.2, 2.7; see also E. GRASSI, RHETORIC AS PHILOSOPHY (1980); TACITUS,
A DIALOGUE OF ORATORS 95-103 (ed. 1911).
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intrinsically a social activity and should be studied as such, in terms both
of its topics and its topicality.
The second tenet of the rhetorical interpretation follows from the first.
Language was, for the rhetoricians, inherently social; it was not to be studied
as grammar or the ideality of langue but rather as a complex and stratified
usage, as parole or performance. The correlate to this discursive approach
to language was a view of the text not as a system but as a series of
functions. It is the rhetorical and social organization of speech-the rela-
tionship of text to institution and institutional functions-that is studied by
the classical rhetoricians. In such a conceptual framework neither text nor
institution can claim to be privileged or to belong to a realm of scientific
necessity. The text is instead a series of rhetorically engaged probabilities
drawn from and applicable to a specific audience. The concept of audience6'
raises a third feature of the rhetorical interpretation and a second aspect of
the text as function, namely, that in its refusal to privilege any specific genre
or audience the rhetorical analysis implicitly deconstructs the exegetical con-
ception of the unity and univocality of the written source. The exegetical
tradition consistently presented the discourse of the law as an inexorably
rational transmission of written meanings. The legal text was a series of
monologic normative formulations, an object of "scientific" analysis, and
required simple application and obedience. The law could not be questioned;
it was given in advance and merely needed careful professional restoration.
For the rhetorical tradition, however, all speech is dialogic: it is the product
of a process of communication entailing a context, a speech situation, and
varying factors of expectation and adaptation to audiences and their probable
responses. "[A]ny concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which
it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute,
charged with value." 62 In classical terms the dialogic character of legal speech
was expressed in terms of the power of eloquence. Speech was a part of the
public sphere of discourse, and for those with access to the public sphere
eloquence was power, or at least it was the possibility of participation in
the political, legal or ideological process of the city state. The Roman
historian Tacitus specifies the condition of the great oratory of the past in
the following terms:
[T]here was the high rank of the defendants and the importance of the
issues, which of themselves were in the highest degree conducive to
eloquence .... For the power of genius grows with the importance of
affairs, nor can anyone produce a speech that is brilliant and renowned
unless he has found a case worthy of it.63
61. A category particularly stressed by C. PERELMAN & L. TYTECA, THE NEw RHErORIC
(1969). For a critical analysis, see F. MORETTI, SIGNS TAKEN FOR WONDERS ch.l (1983).
62. M. BAKHTIN, Discourse in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 276 (1981).
63. TACITUS, supra note 60, at 115-16.
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Alternatively, Tacitus questions the utility of dialogue or eloquence where
the public sphere has radically contracted and survives only, at least in
theory, in the languages of the academy and opposition. 64 Where exegesis
replaces dialogue, where authoritative commentary displaces dialectic, then
recovery of the rhetorical facets of all language use itself becomes an object
of directly political struggle.
CONCLUSION
Just as the exegetical tradition of text and interpretation has its modern
equivalents or counterparts both in explicit conceptions of legal hermeneutics
and in various substantive positivistic textual strategies, so too the rhetorical
tradition of interpretation, to some extent, now travels under new signs or
carries different names. Certainly, aspects of the sociology of language,
critical stylistics and various applications of discourse analysis all come close
to renewing a genuinely rhetorical tradition of text and interpretation. 65 While
it is not possible here to summarize the details of contemporary developments
in disciplines as diverse as media studies and text stylistics, it is perhaps
possible briefly to advert to the common edge that the rhetorical enterprise
lends to any discipline that examines the symbolic and political dimensions
of its communicative practices.
The rhetorical analysis has its basis in forms of political criticism which
endeavored to evaluate the relation and appropriateness of language use to
its specific context as well as to evaluate the content of the speech in terms
of its value for the immediate historical community. These two criteria of
analysis combine in the simple claim that all speech is dialogic in character
and consequently is best understood not solely in the normative linguistic
terms of the various forms of exegesis but rather in the material terms of
its specific context and uses. The issues raised are those of text and institution,
discourse and power, and they are to be posed-whether within critical
semiotics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis or text stylistics-as forms of
uncovering the polysemy-the inherently tropological character-of all lan-
guage use. Such a task is of an especially radical character in relation to
the legal institution and its texts, precisely because legal method and legal
interpretation postulate the unitary nature of legal language and the mon-
64. The Roman historian Tacitus composed the Dialogue of Orators around 100 A.D., and
his account of the decline of rhetoric is both amusing and persuasive. Useful discussions of
the themes there raised can be found in T. EAGLETON, supra note 56; T. TODOROV, supra note
56.
65. This line of argument can be followed most clearly in relation to media studies. See,
e.g., H. DAVIS & P. WALTON, LANGUAGE, IMAGE, MEDIA (1983); CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE
MEDIA (M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran & J. Woollacott eds. 1982). Various arguments
taken from literary criticism can be found in P. DE MAN, ALLEGORIEs OF READING (1979); T.
EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 194 (1983).
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ologic character of legal judgment as essential legitimating features of legal
discourse. The analysis of law as rhetoric has to challenge those claims as
to the privileged status of legal speech at every level and in each of the
guises that they assume: philosophy of law, substantive jurisprudence and
legal practice. In a recent analysis of philosophical semiotics, Umberto Eco
suggests that "behind every strategy of the symbolic mode, be it religious
or aesthetic, there is a legitimating theology ... a positive way to approach
every instance of the symbolic mode would (therefore) be to ask: which
theology legitimates it.'"' The rhetorical tradition poses a further and more
concrete question; in addition to the abstract designation of the form of
mystification or ideology, it also develops a more stringent line of ques-
tioning: what politics does this discourse enshrine and what are the political
effects of this text-not simply what does it say, but what does it do, by
what means and to whom?
66. U. Eco, supra note 16, at 163.
